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RECENT DECISIONS
There have been no cases in Montana pertaining to the question of
whether or not the attorney-client privilege includes agents within the at-
torney-client relationship. The Montana statute which defines the attor-
ney-client privilege makes no reference to the attorney's agents.' How-
ever, it was settled at common law that the agents of the attorney were
within the privilege.' Further, at least twenty-two states have adopted
statutes which are similar to the Montana statute in not expressly includ-
ing agents of the attorney,8' and the uniform construction of these statutes
has been to include such agents.' In view of these factors, it may be ex-
pected that Montana will adopt a similar construction.
It is not surprising that the question has not been presented in Mon-
tana concerning accountants as agents, for the problem seems to arise most
frequently in federal tax litigation. However, the problem could easily
arise in other areas of litigation, and if it does, the instant case provides a
sound guide for its solution.
STEPHEN H. FOSTER
REGULATIONS ADOPTED BY MILK BOARD TO BE VALID MUST BE WITHIN
AUTHORITY DELEGATED BY STATUTE.-The Milk Control Board charged
that defendant had furnished milk dispensers to fraternities free of charge,
thus violating fair-trade practices established by an official order of the
Board issued in 1959. The district court sustained general demurrers to
the plaintiff's complaint on the basis that the complaint failed to state a
cause of action. On appeal to the Montana Supreme Court, held, affirmed.
The regulations as to unfair trade practices adopted by the Board in 1959
are invalid as they did not cover all of the five provisions required by
statute to be included in the regulations. Montana Milk Control Board v.
Community Creamery Co., 366 P.2d 151 (Mont. 1961).
The statute' under which the Milk Board enacted its 1959 order gov-
erning fair-trade practices states:
"'An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any com-
munication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course
of professional employment." REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 93-701.4.
'See, e.g., Madame Due Barr6 v. Livette, Peake 108, 170 Eng. Rep. 96 (N.P. 1791)
Jackson ex dem. Haverly v. French, 3 Wend. (N.Y.) 337, 20 Am. Dec. 699 (1829);
State v. Brown, 2 Marv. (Del.) 380, 36 Atl. 458 (1896).
nALASKA COMp. LAWS ANN. § 58-6-4 (1949) ; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-601 (1947) ; IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 9-203 (1948) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1714 (1946) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-2805 (1949) ; Ky. REV. STAT. § 421.210 (1959) ; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:475
(1951) ; MICH. STAT. ANN § 28.945 (1) (1954) ; Mo. ANN. STAT § 491.161 (1952) ;
NEn. REV. STAT. § 25-1201 (1956) ; N.D. REV. CODE § 31-0106 (1943) ; OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2317.12 (Page, 1954) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 385 (Supp. 1959) ;
OREL. REV. STAT. § 44.040(1) (b) (1957) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 321 (1958) ; S.D.
CODE § 37.0101 (1939) ; TENN. CODE: ANN. § 29-305 1955) ; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROc.
ANN. art. 713 (1941) (applies to both civil and criminal proceedings) ; WASH. REV.
CODE § 5.60.060 (1958) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4992 (1955) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 325.22
(1958) ; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 3-2602 (1945)
'See, e.g., Jayne v. Bateman, 191 Okla. 272, 129 P.2d 188 (1942) ; Foley v. Poschke,
137 Ohio St. 593, 31 N.E.2d 845 (1941). It should be noted, however, that not all
of the states referred to 8upra note 31 have passed on the question.
'Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, 27-414, as amended, Laws of Mont. 1959, ch. 192,
1 8, (Hereinafter REVISED CODES OF MONTANA will be cited R.C.M.)
1962]
1
Kottas: Montana Milk Control Board v. Community Creamery Co.
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1961
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
In addition to the general and special powers heretofore set
forth, the board shall have the power to make and formulate rea-
sonable rules and regulations governing fair-trade practices as
they pertain to the transaction of business among licensees under
this act and among licenses and the general public. Such reason-
able rules and regulations governing fair-trade practices shall
contain, but shall not be limited to, provisions regarding the fol-
lowing methods of doing business which are hereby declared un-
fair, unlawful, and not in the public interest: . . .
Following this section are five distinct subsections or provisions relating to
unfair trade practices.1 The Milk Board's 1959 order' did not contain
specifically all five of these provisions, although the order did contain some
of the provisions, including the one which the defendant was charged with
violating. The court, however, reasoned that inasmuch as the Board's
1959 regulation did not contain specifically all five of the provisions, that
therefore, none of the provisions in the regulation were valid." The court
reached its decision' by construing the words "shall contain" in the en-
abling statute, as indicating that the statute was not intended to stand
independently, but rather as a mere mandatory guide for the Milk Board
in preparing its regulations.
In considering the entire language of the enabling statute, this reason-
ing of the court is questionable. The enabling statute expressly provides
that the rules and regulations of the Board shall contain the five distinct
provisions set out. However, the statute does not stop here; it also states
that the five distinct provisions governing fair trade practices are hereby
declared unfair, unlawful, and not in the public interest." This language
of the statute that the "following methods of doing business are hereby
declared unfair, unlawful, and not in the public interest" appears to indi-
cate an intent on the part of the Legislature that the statute be self-execut-
ing. In other words, it appears that it was he legislative intent that a viola-
tion of any one of the specifically declared unfair trade practices would
lead to liability, irrespective of whether or not the Milk Board had included
'The five distinct provisions set out in R.C.M. 1947, § 27-414 as amended by Laws of
Mont. 1959, ch. 192, § 8 are:
(a) The payment, allowance, or acceptance of secret rebates, secret refunds,
or unearned discounts by any person, whether in the form of money or
otherwise.
(b) The giving of any milk, cream, dairy products, services, or articles of any
kind, except to bona fide charities, for the purpose of securing or retaining
the fluid milk or fluid cream business of any customer.
(c) The extension to certain customers of special prices or services not avail-
able to all customers who purchase milk of like quantity under like terms
and conditions.
(d) The purchasing, processing, bottling, packaging, transporting, delivering
or otherwise handling in any marketing area of any milk which is to be
or is sold or otherwise disposed of at less than the minimum wholesale
and minimum retail prices established by the board pursuant to this act.
(e) The payment of a less price than the applicable producer price established
by the obard pursuant to this act by a distributor to any producer for milk
which is distributed to any person, including agencies of the federal, state
or local government.
'Instant case at 154.
'Instant case at 153-54.
'Instant cast 153.
eSee supra note 1.
[ Vol. 23,
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such practice within its regulations. This reasoning appears even more
plausible when statutes in other jurisdictions are examined.
An Idaho statute' regulating unfair trade practices in the dairy in-
dustry states:
In the marketing of milk, cream and dairy products the following
methods of doing business or trade practices are hereby daclared
unfair and unlawful: . . .
The various trade practices which this Idaho statute lists as as unlawful are
similar to those which the Montana statute sets out. Violations of the
Idaho statute would be punishable' irrespective of whether or not authority
to regulate the same fair trade practices was delegated to an administra-
tive board. Thus, this Idaho statute is a good example of a statute which
was intended to be self-executing. It should be noted that the language
of the Idaho statute which states, "the following methods of doing busi-
ness are hereby declared unfair and unlawful," is almost identical to the
language which is used in the Montana statute in the instant case.
Nevada has a statute which expressly sets out various trade practices
which are declared unlawful. This statute expressly provides that the un-
fair practices of doing business which are set out therein are unlawful
irrespective of whether or not a marketing or stabilization plan is in ef-
fect. T~iis statute is a good example of one which was expressly intended
to be self-executing. Had there been a similar provision in the Montana
statute in the instant case, that the specific unfair trade practices are un-
lawful whether or not contained in the Milk Board's regulations, the prob-
lem that confronted the court would have never arisen.
Another example of an act which was intended to be self-executing is
the Robinson-Patman Act.'m Each provision of the Act begins with the
words "It shall be unlawful" and then declares what particular trade
practice is unlawful. Authority to prosecute violations of the trade prac-
tices declared unlawful under the act is given to appropriate boards or com-
missions irrespective of whether or not any such boards or commission has
included such trade practices within its regulations.1"
Thus, in looking at the language of these various statutes and acts and
by drawing an analogy with the language used by the legislature in the
statute in the instant case, it is arguable that the statute was intended to
be self-executing. Thus, a violation of one of the provisions of the statute
should lead to liability' irrespective of whether or not the Milk Board's
regulation contained all of the provisions.
'IDAHO CODE ANN. § 37-1003(b) (1948).
8IDAHO CODE ANN. § 37-1004 (1948).
9NEvADA REviszD STATUTES § 584-570 (Supp. 1959).
"049 Stat. 1526-28 (1936) ; 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a (1958).
"15 U.S.C. § 21 (1958).
-R.C.M. 1947, § 27-422 states in part: "... A violation of any provision of this act
or of any lawful rule or order of the board, including a failure to answer a sub-
poena or to testify before the board, shall be deemed a misdemeanor. . . ." R.C.M.
1947, § 27-424 states in part: "The board or its authorized agent may institute such
action at law or in equity as may appear necessary to enforce compliance with any
provision of this act or to enforce compliance with any order, rule or regulation,
of the board pursuant to the provisions of this act .. " These statutes appear to
1962]
3
Kottas: Montana Milk Control Board v. Community Creamery Co.
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1961
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
A careful reading of the statute would result in an interpretation
clearly called for by the language and intent of the legislature. The power
to make regulations in this statute is permissive and not mandatory. The
statute merely provides that "the board shall have the power to make and
formulate reasonable rules and regulations.'' Clearly, this is permissive
and not mandatory. In fact, the recently published Bill Drafting Manual
for the Montana Legislative Assembly" suggests that the word "may"
should be used in lieu of the words "shall have the power to." Recognizing
that the power to make regulations is permissive, and, further, that there
are words which ordinarily mean that the act described is unlawful with-
out further action by the legislature or any other body, there is no question
that in the absence of any other provision, these provisions are self-execut-
ing. The coart, however, was disturbed and, it is submitted, led astray
by the word "shall" in the second sentence of the provision which states:'
"Such reasonable rules and regulations governing fair-trade practices shall
contain...." The court was faced with the word "shall" which on the face
of it is mandatory, but which appears with respect to regulations which
need not be promulgated at all. The court chose to rely on this one word
"shall" to give meaning to, and to change the obvious meaning of, the
other words in the section when viewed in the light of its purpose and the
clear meaning of the other words. Perhaps the section is not as clearly
drafted as it should be, but if this be the case, the court should give mean-
ing to the words which are consistent with its purpose and which give
meaning to every clause in the section.
However, even if it was found that the statute in the instant case was
not intended to be self-executing, still the position of the court that the
words "shall contain" required the Board's 1959 regulation to include
specifically all five of the unfair trade provisions, is questionable.
As a general rule the word "shall" when used in a statute is manda-
tory or imperative." However, the word "shall" when used in a statute
does not always import that its provisions are mandatory. Depending upon
the legislative intent, the surrounding circumstances, and the objects to be
accomplished, "shall" may be construed as directory or permissive.' Ac-
cording to some authority, when the object of the statute is to subserve
some public purpose, the provisions may be held directory or mandatory
as will best accomplish that purpose." If this principle is applied to the
instant case one might argue that "shall contain" should have been con-
strued as permissive since this would best serve the public purpose. If
the statute were construed as permissive in the instant case, a conviction of
indicate that a violation of any one of the five specific provisions of section 27-414
would be a misdemenor and would allow the board to institute proceedings for such
violation, irrespective of whether or not such provision was included within the
regulation of the Milk Board.
"See supra note 1.
mBill Drafting Manual of the Montana Legislative Council at 16. (1962).
"See supra note 1.
"State ex. rel. McCabe v. DistrictCourt, 106 Mont. 272, 76 P.2d 634 (1938) ; Thomas
v. Ramberg, 245 Minn. 474, 73 N.W.2d 195 (1955) ; 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 380.
"Carter v. Seaboard Finance Co., 33 Cal. 2d 564, 203 P.2d 758 (1949); People v.
Municipal Court of Oxnard, 145 Cal. App. 2d 767, 303 P.2d 375 (1957); 82 C.J.S.
Statutes § 380.
"Pulcifer v. Alamedia County, 29 Cal. 2d 258, 175 P.2d 1 (1946).
[Vol. 23,
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the defendant might have resulted, and, as a consequence, the consuming
public would have been protected from unfair trade practices.
Determining the legislative intent is the important factor in deciding
whether the terms "shall contain" are mandatory or permissive." The
court in the instant case,' although not specifically discussing the question
of whether the terms of the statute were mandatory or permissive, holds
that they were mandatory. How the court arrived at the conclusion that
the terms of the statute were mandatory is uncertain. The court did not
specifically discuss the possible legislative intent in placing the terms in
the enabling statute. Thus, whether the court did consider the possible
legislative intent in arriving at its decision, or whether it engaged in judicial
legislation of its own is not apparent from the court's opinion.
Further, even if the terms were clearly mandatory, the question re-
mains as to whether the alleged dereliction by the Board in not including
specifically all five of the required provisions would invalidate those pro-
visions of the Board's regulation which were enacted within the authority
of, and which served the purpose of, the enabling statute. The court in
the instant case relied on the principle that for a regulation of an admin-
istrative body to be valid, it must be within the authority delegated by
statute.' How the court could rely on this general principle of law and
yet hold those provisions of the statute invalid which were enacted within
the authority of the enabling statute is far from clear. Those provisions of
the Board's regulation which were enacted within the authority of the en-
abling statute should be valid. Apparently, the court was relying on the
fact that all five provisions followed the empowering clause in the same
section. Does this mean that if each area of regulation, in the instant case,
had been set forth in a separate subdivision or in a separate act by the
legislature, the court would have refused to uphold those regulations which
were enacted within the authority of the separate acts, sections, or subdi-
visions of the act? To state the question reveals the answer. Would the
court say that all acts of the Board are invalid because it failed to per-
form one act? The court cites no authority or sound reason which will ex-
plain why those provisions, which were enacted within the authority of
the enabling statute, should not be valid.
The court's decision holding invalid those provisions enacted within
the statutory mandate also appears to be contrary to the general purpose
of the legislature in regulating the milk industry. By statute, that pur-
pose "is to protect and promote public welfare and to eliminate unfair
and demoralizing trade practices.' Tlhe court's decision cannot be said
to have promoted the public welfare or to ha-ve been a step forward in
eliminating unfair and demoralizing trade practices. The decision of the
court may well result in a general demoralization of the fluid milk indus-
try, eventually causing irresparable harm to the consuming public.
The action of the court in the instant case will certainly need further
clarification in the future. The court appears to require regulations of
"See supra note 16.
'Instant case at 153-54.
tmInstant case at 154.
R.C.M. 1947, § 27-402.
1962]
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administrative boards to be strictly within the enabling statute. The court
emphasized this desire by holding invalid even those provisions which
were enacted within the statutory mandate. Should the court again be
confronted with an issue similar to the instant case, a comprehensive con-
sideration of the legislative intent and all of the statutory lanuage should
be undertaken. Whether the legislature intended the enabling statute to
be self-executing, and the words "shall contain" to be mandatory or per-
missive, are the questions which the court clearly will must consider. In
the meantime, however, administrative boards in promolgating regulations
should do so with an eye toward the possibility that all their regulations
will be declared invalid if they do not conform strictly to the enabling
statute by doing everything which they might possibly be required to do
or, perhaps, authorized to do.
LEO J. KOTTAS, JR.
VOLUNTARY PAYMENTS MADE TO PROTECT ATTORNEY'S BUSINESS REPU-
TATION ARE ORDINARY AND NECESSARY BUSINESS EXPENSES FOR FEDERAL
TAX PURPOSES.-A firm of New York attorneys often acted as inter-
mediaries in financing new businesses and going concerns. To secure money
for a business the attorneys solicited clients and business associates who
loaned their money on the recommendation of these attorneys. The busi-
ness involved in this case, wihich appeared on reasonable inspection by the
attorneys to be operating successfully, was really a fiction devised by a
swindler. The persons solicited by the attorneys found themselves holding
worthless claims for the money they advanced to the swindler. Although
the attorneys had no legal obligation to repay the lost loan funds, they
undertook to do so in order to protect their good will and reputation as
attorneys. After repaying the loans, the attorneys deducted the amounts
of such payments as business expenses under the "ordinary and necessary"
clause of section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code in 1954. The Commis-
sioner brought an action to recover additional taxes on the grounds that
these were not properly deductible business expenses under that section.
The United States Tax Court held that these payments were ordinary and
necessary business expenses and that the deductions should have been al-
lowed. Pepper v. Commissioner, 36 T.C ....... , no. 88 (1961).
The court in the principal case was confronted with the task of con-
struing the broad terms of section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 which states: "In computing net income there shall be allowed as
deductions . . . all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred
during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business."'
To facilitate discussion of section 162 its requirements may be broken
down into and raise three general questions: 1) Was the expenses incurred
in carrying on any trade or business? 2) Was the expense necessary?
'Section 23(a) (1) (A), 1939 Internal Revenue Code. (Similar to 1954 Code Section
162(a)).
[Vol. 23,
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